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Abstract : Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. Three strategies
for making true evidence claims in spite of this fallibility are strengthen-
ing the support for those assumptions, weakening conclusions, and using
multiple independent tests to produce robust evidence. Reliability itself,
understood in frequentist terms, does not explain the usefulness of all three
strategies; robustness, in particular, sometimes functions in a way that is
not well-characterized in terms of reliability. I argue that, in addition to
reliability, the security of evidence claims is of epistemic value, where an
evidence claim is secure relative to an epistemic situation if it remains true
in all scenarios that are epistemically possible relative to that epistemic
situation. 1
1I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Jan Sprenger,
Joe Salerno, and audiences at Eastern Tennessee State University, University of Frankfurt
and University of Wuppertal.
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1 Three strategies
Assessments of evidence depend on substantive assumptions that function in
an argument from evidence neither as part of the evidence itself, nor as the
conclusion. Such assumptions may include claims about the sampling pro-
cedure, about the control of extraneous variables, or about the adequacy of
a certain mathematical model for representing a substantive scientific claim,
as well as theoretical claims about phenomena implicated in the experimen-
tal procedures, as in the case of ‘theory-mediated’ measurements.
These assumptions should not be confused with “mere assumptions.”
They can be supported by substantial reasons. However, these assumptions
are fallible. Heinrich Hertz assumed that his cathode tubes were sufficiently
evacuated to yield the deflection of cathode rays, supposing them to be
electrically charged. He was mistaken. Galileo assumed that the combined
orbital and rotational motion of the earth would producing a sloshing of the
oceans that would be observed as tidal phenomena, and concluded that tidal
phenomena constituted evidence for such motion. This was not the case. In
1984, Carlo Rubbia of the UA1 Collaboration at CERN believed that, in
data collected from high energy proton collisions looking for a decay signa-
ture of the top quark, background processes had been sufficiently accounted
for to regard the remaining excess of events as evidence of top quark pro-
duction. A significant source of background had been overlooked, however.
There was no evidence for the top quark until ten years later (Staley 2004a).
In describing these examples in this way, I am using a concept of evi-
dence that resembles in several respects what Peter Achinstein calls “poten-
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tial evidence” (Achinstein 2001, 27–28). First, the kind of evidence concept
here invoked is not relativized, either to a person, or to an epistemic situa-
tion.2 Second, these evidence claims are objective in that they are true or
not independently of what anyone believes about the data, the hypothesis in
question, or the relations between them.3 Third, the question of whether E
is evidence for H, according to this concept, can (and typically does) depend
on facts beyond E, a feature that Achinstein denotes by saying that, in this
sense, evidence is “potentially empirically incomplete.”
An obvious strategy for coping with the fallibility of such evidence
claims is to seek further support for any assumptions about which one is
uncertain, and to use only those assumptions whose support is thus strength-
ened. Call this the strengthening strategy. Its strongest form would be to
rely only on those assumptions for which one has conclusive evidence. But
the effectiveness of the conclusiveness standard is significantly at odds with
its practical value. If we give “conclusive evidence” a sufficiently strong
reading to completely remove the threat of false background assumptions
(supposing this even to be possible), we will rarely if ever be in a position to
make any evidence claims. Furthermore, some of the assumptions on which
we might wish to rely might be difficult to establish conclusively. The rel-
evant data might, for example, be too expensive to acquire, or inaccessible
with existing technology. Strengthening, therefore, while a valuable strat-
egy, carries a cost, such that we might wish to supplement it with another,
2See section five for more on the notion of an epistemic situation.
3Here I am setting aside special cases, such as some forms of bias arising from “peeking”
at data, in which investigators’ beliefs may be causally relevant to the reliability of the
test procedure used (see Staley 2004a, 278–87) .
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potentially less costly strategy.4
A second strategy is to keep one’s original assumptions, but to alter
one’s conclusion to a claim logically weaker than the original. The obvi-
ous term for this strategy is weakening. Instead of claiming that one has
discovered evidence for, say, the positron (in the sense of the anti-electron
of current theory), one might claim only evidence for a positively charged
particle with mass on the order of that of the negatively charged electron.5
This strategy also has an extreme version, which is to draw conclusions that
say no more than the assumptions of which we are already certain.
A third strategy is to appeal to robustness considerations (Campbell
and Fiske 1959; Culp 1995; Levins 1966; Staley 2004b; Trout 1993; Wimsatt
1981). In appealing to robustness, one copes with the potential for error
by basing one’s evidence claims on the convergent outcomes of multiple
tests drawing, to some extent, upon independent assumptions. Call this the
robustness strategy.
The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a dimension of epis-
temic assessment that is appropriate to these strategies, particularly robust-
ness. Such an effort is needed because, although we might assume (as I do)
that some kind of requirement of reliability, in a broadly frequentist sense,
of one’s inferential procedure is central to the notion of empirical evidence,
4As a valuable implementation of the strengthening strategy, consider, for example,
the program of mis-specification testing discussed by Mayo and Spanos (2004).
5In fact, in announcing the first evidence for the positron in 1933, Carl Anderson
did claim to have evidence for the positron (thus coining the term as an abbreviation
of “positive electron”) but meant by this only to indicate a particle with the properties
mentioned in this “weakened” claim.
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there are reasons to suspect that reliability considerations are insufficient
by themselves to explicate what is at stake in coping with the fallibility
of background assumptions, at least insofar as these are addressed by the
robustness strategy. A somewhat different perspective can put the strength-
ening, weakening, and robustness strategies into focus, so that it can be seen
clearly how all three strategies contribute in different ways to the same epis-
temic goal.
In what follows, I will illustrate the methodological issues in ques-
tion with a recent example of the robustness strategy from the search for
dark matter (section two). That example will also serve as the basis for
an argument to the effect that what is at issue in at least some uses of the
robustness strategy cannot be captured by appealing to reliability consid-
erations alone (section three). In section four, I introduce as a heuristic
the notion of a space of epistemic possibilities, drawing upon recent work
by David Chalmers. With the aid of that heuristic, I deploy an analogy
between geographical space and epistemic space to motivate my definitions
of secure evidence and secure inference (section five). Those definitions are
followed in section six by general arguments for the epistemic relevance of
security, and I conclude with some comments on the analysis of knowledge
and on some similarities between security and logical probability.
2 An Example: Evidence for Dark Matter?
To make these preliminary considerations more concrete, consider a recent
example of the robustness strategy, used in the context of the assertion of ev-
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idence for the existence of weakly interacting massive particles (WIMP’s).
The primary evidence claim in question is that data revealing an annual
modulation of the detection rate in particle interactions with nuclei in scin-
tillating sodium-iodide crystals is evidence that those crystals are immersed
in a ‘WIMP wind’ due to Earth’s movement through a WIMP halo that per-
vades the galaxy. That claim has been put forth by the DAMA-NaI group,
operating deep underground at the Gran Sasso laboratory in Italy. DAMA’s
claim has been contested by the negative results of other groups using more
conventional experimental methods (i.e., looking for statistical excesses in
the detection rate beyond expectations from background). The dispute has
been discussed in admirable detail in a thought-provoking article by Robert
Hudson (2007a).6 The present paper takes no stance regarding the dispute
over DAMA’s results; here I attempt only to understand the nature of one
argument implicated in that dispute. Thus the present paper will attempt
only to sketch very roughly the broad outlines of DAMA’s analysis and
result.
As Hudson explains, the initial positive result from DAMA was pre-
sented both in terms of an estimate of the WIMP mass (mW ) and interaction
cross section (ξσp), and in the form of a “contour” in the space of possible
values of mW and ξσp.7 DAMA’s basic search strategy is to examine the
6I am grateful to Robert Hudson for bringing this example to my attention. I must
note that in (Hudson 2007b) he employs the debate over DAMA’s results more broadly to
argue against the methodological value of robustness. I do not propose here to dispute the
arguments of that paper, but only note that under Hudson’s interpretation of the term,
the argument here considered does not exemplify an appeal to robustness.
7More precisely, they use the quantity ξσp in (Bernabei et al. 1998; 1999; 2000), where
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distribution of interaction events with regard to energy, location within the
detector, and time, over a one-year data collection period. This information
is summarized in the number Nijk, where index i indicates the i-th day, j
indicates the j-th detector, and k indicates the k-th energy interval or “bin”,
each event being recorded as falling into a bin of width 1 keV, from 2-20
keV.
The analysis of this data assumes a theoretical model in which the
earth moves through a “halo” of WIMP dark matter with a variable velocity
vr(t) = VSun+VEarthcosγcosω(t−t0) in the galactic frame, where VSun is the
Sun’s velocity with respect to the halo, VEarth is the Earth’s orbital velocity
about the sun, γ = 60◦ is the angle of inclination of Earth’s orbital plane
with respect to the galactic plane, ω = 2pi/T with T = 1 year, and t0 ' June
2nd. This model is used then to derive a first order Taylor approximation for
the signal rate in the k-th energy interval as Sk = S0,k + Sm,kcosω(t − t0).
Consider this, with the parameters, respectively, for the unmodulated and
modulated terms, S0,k, Sm,k 6= 0 for at least some k as the theoretical model
for a WIMP annual modulation.
To make the connection between this theoretical model and the results
mentioned above, DAMA assumes a model of the data as being generated
by a Poisson process with mean value µijk = (bjk + S0,k + Sm,kcosω(ti −
ξ = σWIMP/σ0, σ0 = 0.3 GeV cm
−3, and σp is the WIMP interaction cross section on the
proton. The results presented in (Belli et al. 2002) refer to the quantity ξσ
(nucleon)
scalar , where
ξ is defined as the “fractional amount of local nonbaryonic [Dark Matter] density which
is ascribed to the WIMP responsible for the effect,” and σ
(nucleon)
scalar is the WIMP-nucleon
scalar interaction cross section. The following discussion uses ξσp for simplicity, though
strictly speaking this slightly misrepresents the latter results.
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t0))Mj∆ti∆Ejk. Here bjk represents a time independent background,Mj is
the mass of the j-th detector, ∆ti is the actual running time for the detector
on the i-th day, ∆E = 1 keV represents the width of the energy intervals,
and jk is the analysis cut efficiency. A time correlation analysis is then
employed that uses a maximum likelihood method to produce an estimate
of the WIMP mass and interaction cross section. The likelihood function L
can be written in terms of µijk and Nijk, and the maximum likelihood can
be determined by minimizing the function y = −2ln(L ) − const. Such an
analysis, carried out on their first year of data, yields the estimates MW =
(59+36−19)GeV and ξσp = (1.0
+0.1
−0.4) 10
−5 pb. In addition, by taking the ratio of
likelihoods between the hypothesis H1 of annual modulation, with specific
values of mW and ξσp, and the hypothesis H0 of no annual modulation as a
test statistic λ, they generate a plot of the region in mW − ξσp space where
H1 is favored over H0 at a 90% confidence level.8 This latter analysis is the
source of the contour mentioned above.
The 2002 paper by Belli et al. that features a robustness analysis ad-
vertises itself as an extension of the “previous analyses” (those using the
just described methods of data analysis as applied to one (Bernabei et al.
1998), two (Bernabei et al. 1999), and four (Bernabei et al. 2000) years
worth of data) “by discussing in detail the implications of the results of
the uncertainties on the dark matter galactic velocity distribution” (Belli et
al. 2002). More specifically, those earlier analyses adopted the “standard”
isothermal sphere model of the WIMP galactic halo. Belli et al. note that,
in spite of its simplicity, a number of the assumptions of that model “are
8They use the quantity -2lnλ as a χ2 statistic.
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not strongly constrained by astrophysical observations” (ibid., 2). More-
over, the expected rate of WIMP interactions is determined in part by the
distribution function for WIMPs in their six-dimensional position-velocity
phase space, a function that in turn depends on on the model of the galactic
halo. That expected rate, naturally, has in turn consequences for the likeli-
hood functions on which the earlier analyses depended. Thus, they seek to
“study in a systematic way possible departures from the isothermal sphere
model . . . specifically . . .modifications arising from the various matter den-
sity profiles, effects due to anisotropies of the velocity dispersion tensor and
rotation of the galactic halo” (ibid., 1). The paper proceeds to examine four
general classes of galactic halo models: spherically symmetric matter density
with isotropic velocity dispersion, spherically symmetric matter density with
nonisotropic velocity dispersion, axisymmetric models, and triaxial models.
Contours are presented for a variety of versions of each class of models. The
details need not further detain us. Noteworthy, however, is the conclusion
drawn: “The hypothesis of WIMP annual modulation, already favored in
the previous studies by using an isothermal sphere, is confirmed in all the
investigated scenarios, and the effects of the different halo models on the
determination of the allowed maximum likelihood region in the WIMP mass
and WIMP-nucleon cross section have been derived” (ibid., 16).
3 Reliability, Robustness, and Security
I claimed above that there are reasons to doubt that frequentist reliability
considerations alone are sufficient to account for the epistemic value of the
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robustness strategy as employed in examples like that just described. In this
section I defend that claim.
The DAMA group offers their robustness analysis of their evidence
claim in order to explain “the implications on [their previous results] of the
uncertainties on the dark matter galactic velocity distribution” (ibid., 1).
That is, they had previously employed a model of the galactic dark matter
halo that, supposing there is such a halo, might not correctly describe it.
Might the correct way to understand their analysis be that they are
attempting to demonstrate or enhance the reliability of their results, by em-
ploying a procedure that restricts the probability of arriving at an erroneous
result? For example, we might attempt to view them as applying a severe-
test requirement, in Mayo’s sense (Mayo 1996) to their earlier evidence claim.
That requirement can be framed as follows: Suppose that hypothesis H is
subjected to test procedure T , resulting in data E; then H’s passing T with
E constitutes the passing of a severe test (and hence evidence for H) just
in case E fits H, and the probability of H passing T with an outcome such
as E (i.e., one that fits H at least as well as E does), given that H is false,
is very low (ibid., esp. 178–87).
It is arguable, even plausible, that one could regard DAMA’s original
evidence claim as resting on the satisfaction of the severe test requirement.
Indeed, that some frequentist reliability considerations enter into that argu-
ment is ensured by the use of the confidence level construction methodology,
the rationale for which lies precisely in the long-run error characteristics en-
sured by the appropriate use of a test statistic that follows a χ2 distribution.
However, the robustness argument offered by Belli et al. eludes such a char-
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acterization in terms of severity or even some more general frequentist notion
of reliability. The paper seeks to address an uncertainty regarding an as-
sumption that is used in defending the reliability of their original inference
(from the annual modulation data to the contour described above). How-
ever, the argument is obviously not meant to give evidence that the original
assumption regarding the galactic halo is true, since the paper discusses
other possible models and makes no effort to argue against them.
Perhaps more plausibly, we might consider the possibility that DAMA
is here attempting to give what Staley has called second-order evidence
(2004b): they are giving evidence, based on the agreement between the
contours generated by different galactic halo model assumptions, that the
annual modulation data really are evidence for the existence of WIMP dark-
matter. On the severe-testing account, this would require showing, in effect,
that, assuming the annual modulation data is not evidence for a WIMP
annual modulation, there is a very low probability these different analyses
would yield contours that agree as well as these do. However, nowhere in
the paper presenting this analysis can such an argument be found. Indeed,
it is difficult to see how such an argument could be made within the do-
main of frequentist statistics. To do so would require answering the difficult
question: On what would the error rates of such a test depend? Or, more
precisely, how would one model the scenario “the annual modulation data
are not evidence for a WIMP annual modulation” so as to be able to estimate
such error rates, even qualitatively?9
9I am not claiming that the convergence of results from independent tests never consti-
tute a severe test of any hypothesis, but only that some uses of such convergence directed
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Rather than awkwardly trying to force this kind of argument into a
frequency-reliability framework, I propose that we attend more closely to
the kind of problem that such robustness arguments seek to address and
what is distinctive about how they address that problem. Specifically, ro-
bustness arguments are a response to uncertainty regarding assumptions,
and they respond, not by removing that uncertainty (as in the strengthen-
ing strategy), but by showing how evidence claims remain valid in spite of
that uncertainty. In the next section, I begin the articulation of a framework
for making sense of such a strategy.
4 Possibility Spaces
In order to motivate the construction that follows, I will employ as a heuristic
the idea of an epistemic space, drawing upon some recent work on epistemic
possibility by David Chalmers (2008).10
When an investigator puts forth an empirical evidence claim, she does
so on the basis of a number of other claims. Typically, some of these are
claims that the investigator knows to be true, while other claims are relied
upon without being known to be true. (Some claims may even be used that
are known to be false, as when errors are intentionally over-estimated in the
interest of being conservative in one’s conclusions.)
The idea of a space of epistemic possibility gives us an intuitive way
at addressing uncertainties regarding model assumptions cannot be thus interpreted.
10For Chalmers, epistemic space is not merely a heuristic, but part of a theory of the
semantics of statements of epistemic possibility. That theory may be correct, but need
not be for my purposes.
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of depicting this situation. The rough picture is that of a space of scenarios
that might for all we know be actual. (This notion of epistemic possibility,
introduced by Hintikka in his (1962) is to be contrasted with the idea of sub-
junctive possibility, typically described in terms of possible worlds as ways
the world might have been or would be if certain counterfactual conditions
were to obtain.) This notion has been explicated in different ways – for
example, as a contextual notion by DeRose (1991), and non-contextually by
Chalmers (2008). As far as I can tell, nothing in the discussion that follows
turns on just which analysis we use.
In Chalmers’ discussion, a picture of the space of epistemic possibility
emerges that, independently of the details of his analysis, captures the right
features for the present argument. Chalmers distinguishes what he calls
“deep epistemic possibility” from “strict epistemic possibility,” where the
former is meant to capture “ways the world might be, prior to what anyone
knows,” and the latter is meant to capture ways the world might be, relative
to a particular body of knowledge. While exactly what scenarios are deeply
epistemically possible will no doubt be a matter of debate, what is strictly
epistemically possible, relative to any body of knowledge K that includes
more than what is knowable a priori, will be some subspace of the space of
what is deeply epistemically possible. Furthermore, as knowledge is gained,
more scenarios are ruled out, and the space of what is strictly epistemically
possible shrinks. To state it with a little more precision, though still infor-
mally: If (i) Ω is the space of epistemically possible scenarios relative to a
body of knowledge K, (ii) Ω′ is the space of epistemically possible scenarios
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relative to K ′, and (iii) K ⊂ K ′, then Ω′ ⊂ Ω.11
5 Security: An analogy and definitions
Using this picture of the space of epistemic possibility as a heuristic, we
can depict the situation of the investigator who seeks to make an evidence
claim in terms of the investigator not knowing ‘where she is’ in the space of
epistemic possibilities relative to her knowledge. Of course, the assumptions
she uses in advancing her evidence claim that she knows to be true, will be
true throughout that space, but other claims that she uses may be true in
some regions of epistemic possibility, and false in others. What is more, the
evidence claim itself may or may not be true throughout the entire range of
epistemic possiblities.
This raises the question of security. To state it roughly: the investiga-
tor has good reason to consider whether it is possible that her evidence claim
is false. If it is possible, what is the range of possible scenarios in which it
is false, and can steps be taken to eliminate some of those possibilities?
11Note that at this point all reference to deep epistemic space has dropped out. Hence-
forth, I will only make use of the idea of a space of epistemic possibilities that is relative
to an epistemic situation (taken to include a body of knowledge). That there is a unique
space of scenarios that corresponds to “ways the world might be, prior to what anyone
knows,” is far from obvious, and is in any case not necessary for the view defended here.
Thus, all uses of ‘epistemic possibility’ and its cognates should henceforth be understood
in the sense of ‘strict epistemic possibility’.
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5.1 An analogy: Where am I?
Before introducing a more precise definition of security, I introduce an anal-
ogy. The point of this analogy is to make intuitive both the epistemic
relevance of security considerations and their distinctness from reliability.
It is reasonable for epistemic agents to consider security as well as reliability
in drawing conclusions. Furthermore, although judgments about security
may be about reliability, on the present account, in the sense that the as-
sumptions at issue in assessing the security of an evidence claim might be
reliability assumptions, security judgments are not judgments of reliabil-
ity. In order to clarify how reliability and security are related, consider the
following analogy between geographical space and the space of epistemic
possibility.
Let us suppose that Charlotte is dropped onto the surface of the earth
in an amphibious vehicle that gives her no visual access to her surroundings,
but over which she has directional control once she is on the surface of the
earth (the vehicle automatically navigates around or over objects so as not
to collide with them we’ll suppose). Charlotte’s objective is to determine
in which approximate direction is the geographical North Pole, and she is
offered a choice between two instruments for use in that task.
Imagine two versions of this story. In the first version, the instruments
between which Charlotte must choose are a compass and an AM radio. In
the second version, her choice is between a compass and a GPS device.
Consider the first version. You might be wondering what good the
AM radio might be. If Charlotte can, by moving around, figure out where
the radio stations she is picking up are located, and correlate that with a
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direction that takes her in the direction of more northerly locations, then
she can use the AM radio to determine the approximate direction of the
North Pole. However, this will only work if she starts out in a place where
she understands the language, or at least can pick out place names when
they are uttered on the radio, and she knows which of those named places
are further north than others. So the AM radio will help her, but only over a
rather limited range of the Earth’s surface (it would not, presumably, work
over most of the oceans, for example).
A compass is commonly understood to be a reliable indicator of the ap-
proximate direction of the North Pole. The compass needle, however, really
responds to Earth’s magnetic field, and thus points not to the geographical
North Pole, but to the Magnetic North.12 Consequently, the compass also
will fail, if Charlotte happens to start out anywhere very close to the mag-
netic North Pole. However, the region in which it will fail is smaller than
the region in which the AM radio will fail. Thus, even if the use of the AM
radio to determine direction were not unwieldy, complicated, and somewhat
inaccurate, Charlotte would still have reason to prefer the compass.
The decision in the second version seems similarly easy: The GPS de-
vice will presumably give accurate information about directions everywhere
that the compass will, but also in locations near Magnetic North where the
compass will fail, making it the preferable choice.
Suppose, now, that I stipulate that, within the domains in which
12In fact, the direction of the compass needle reacts to the local magnetic field, and
typically does not point exactly to the magnetic North. More accurate use of the compass
requires knowledge of the local magnetic declination, given on some maps.
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they function correctly, each device works equally reliably, in the sense that,
provided you are within that region in which a given device is usable (within
reach of a number of AM stations with identifiable locations, not too close to
magnetic north, etc.), that device will not point you in the wrong direction
any more often than the other devices will in their regions of usefulness.
Our judgments of the relative utility of the three devices, I submit, will be
unchanged. This is because the reasoning behind the original preferences
was not based on how often the devices would yield errors, but on the
geographical range of their usefulness.
To put the point another way: Charlotte has a question, and an in-
strument (the compass, let’s suppose) that can potentially be used to answer
that question. Is the direction of the compass needle evidence for the ap-
proximate direction of the geographic North? Whether that is so depends
on where Charlotte is on the surface of the earth, which she does not know.
Since, for all she knows, she could be anywhere on the earth, given two pos-
sible sources of evidence regarding the direction of geographic North, all else
being equal, she has good reason to prefer the instrument that is reliable
over a larger geographic region.
Just as Charlotte does not know where she in geographical space, we
do not know where we are in the space of epistemic possibilities. I take this
to be true by definition of epistemic possibility. This space simply is, for
a given person, the space of all the ways that things might be, for all that
person knows.
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5.2 Security defined
Thus far I have attempted to argue that there is a category of epistemic
appraisal in addition to reliability that is appropriate to consider in the eval-
uation of evidence. I have appealed to the notion of epistemic possibility
and the heuristic notion of a space of epistemic possibilities to characterize
this category at an intuitive level. In the interests of engendering theoretical
elaboration and methodological implementation of this claim, I next postu-
late a set of related working definitions for security. My claims for these
working definitions at this stage are only that they elaborate the intuitive
considerations just discussed and that they may prove a useful starting point
for more systematic work to come.
Definition 1 (secure evidence) Let an evidence claim be a claim of the
form ‘Data E are evidence for the hypothesis that H.’ Suppose that Ω0 is
the set of all epistemically possible scenarios relative to epistemic situation
K, and Ω1 ⊆ Ω0. An evidence claim C is secure throughout Ω1 relative to
K iff for any scenario ω ∈ Ω1, C is true. If C is secure throughout Ω0 then
it is fully secure.
Definition 2 (secure inference) An inference13 made from E to H is
13To make an inference from E to H is to treat E, which is taken to be true, as
a good reason for endorsing H as true. I use the notion of ‘endorsement’ here rather
than ‘belief’ (cp. Achinstein 2001; Staley 2008) so as to indicate that it is the practical
dimension of science that is of interest here, as opposed to the mental states of scientists.
Endorsement here generalizes the notion of assertion in such a way as to include such
qualified statements of positive epistemic appraisal, as ‘H is very likely to be true’ or ‘it
is reasonably certain that H is true.’
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secure throughout Ω1 relative to K iff the claim ‘E is evidence for H’ is
secure throughout Ω1 relative to K.
Before proceeding to argue for the epistemic value of security more
directly, a few comments on the notion of an epistemic situation and the
issue of relativization are in order. The notion of an epistemic situation is
borrowed from Achinstein (2001), who describes an epistemic situation as a
situation in which “among other things, one knows or believes that certain
propositions are true, one is not in a position to know or believe that others
are, and one knows (or does not know) how to reason from the former to the
hypothesis” (ibid., 20). To this I would add as components of the epistemic
situation that one knows (or does not know) how to do things (such as the
manipulation of data or instruments, or the performance of speech acts) that
facilitate the inference from data and other propositions to the hypothesis
of interest.
It will be noted that the idea of an epistemic situation is much richer
and multidimensional than the idea of a body of knowledge representable
as a set of sentences. I have used the epistemic situation idea in defining
security because it does seem that what is epistemically possible for me
should indeed depend not only on my propositional knowledge, but also my
inferential abilities and other forms of know-how. In DeRose’s discussion of
epistemic possibility (1991), such considerations do have a place, but only as
‘contextual’ factors in determining the epistemic possibility of propositions,
and not as constitutive elements in the space of epistemic possibility. They
have no apparent place in Chalmers’ notion of epistemic space (Chalmers
2008).
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Finally, it should be noted that, although security of evidence is here
treated as relative to an epistemic situation, the truth of an evidence claim
is not. Thus the evidence concept here should not be confused with what
Achinstein has called “E-S evidence,” understood as evidence that is rel-
ative to an epistemic situation. As Achinstein emphasizes, although E-S
evidence is among the evidence concepts used in scientific contexts, other
more important evidence concepts are not thus relativized. It is the latter,
non-relativized evidence concept that is employed here. In short, the actual
truth of evidence claims is independent of epistemic situation, but secu-
rity is relative to epistemic situation, because whether an evidence claim is
epistemically possibly false is relative to an epistemic situation.
6 Arguments for security
Although the analogy with geography in the Charlotte example should make
the epistemic relevance of security plausible, a more systematic argument
that employs the definitions just given would make a stronger case. I next
present two such arguments, both of which assume that investigators seeking
to make evidence claims have certain (plausibly very widely held) epistemic
aims. The first argument shows that, all else being equal, such an investiga-
tor should prefer to make a given evidence claim under conditions in which
it is fully secure to making it under conditions in which it is not fully secure.
In the second argument, I show that, all else being equal, an investigator
should prefer to make a given evidence claim when it is more secure (e.g.,
in virtue of the application of a robustness strategy) to making that claim
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when it is less secure (i.e., without having applied the robustness strategy).
Both arguments use the following suppositions: Suppose that S is a
person engaged in empirical inquiry with regard to some question Q, to
which H is a hypothetical answer. E1 and E2 represent two possible bodies
of evidence relevant to H. C1 is the claim: “E1 is evidence for H.” C2 is
the claim: “E2 is evidence for H.” K represents S’s epistemic situation at
a particular time.
In both arguments, there is also an assumption about S’s aims: S seeks
to make evidence claims that will not be refuted by subsequent inquiry.
Now for the first argument: Suppose that C1 is fully secure relative
to K. It follows from definition 1 that for all epistemically possible changes
in K, C1 is true. Suppose furthermore that C2 is not fully secure relative
to K. From the same definition it then follows that for some epistemically
possible changes in K, C2 is false. Hence if S makes claim C1, she makes an
evidence claim that, given what she knows, will remain true. On the other
hand, if she makes claim C2, then for all she knows her evidence claim might
be false and hence be refuted by subsequent inquiry. So S should prefer to
make the fully secure claim C1 rather than the insecure claim C2.
The more interesting and realistic case involves partial security. Sup-
pose that Ω0 is the set of all scenarios epistemically possible relative to K.
Suppose that C1 is secure throughout Ω1 and C2 is secure throughout Ω2,
where Ω2 ⊂ Ω1 ⊂ Ω0. Since both Ω1 and Ω2 are strict subsets of the set of
all epistemically possible scenarios, if S makes either claim, then her claim
might, for all she knows, turn out to be false. But there is an asymmetry be-
tween the potential failures of the two claims. For any epistemically possible
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scenario in which C1 fails, C2 also fails. But there are some epistemically-
possible scenarios in which C2 fails, but C1 does not. Thus the scenarios
in which C1 continues to be upheld as true include all those in which C2
continues to be upheld as true, as well as some of those in which C2 is dis-
covered to be false. Since S aims to avoid making evidence claims that are
discovered to be false, she should prefer to make claim C1 rather than C2.
It will be noted that in this last case, the secure regions for claims C1
and C2 were nested, and one might wonder what might be said about cases
in which this is not so. For example Ω1 and Ω2 might overlap without either
being contained in the other, or they might be entirely disjoint. (Charlotte’s
situation could be a case of overlap, for example, if the AM radio method
were actually usable by her in regions in the Arctic Circle where the compass
would fail.) It would be tempting here to say that one should then consider
the size of the secure regions of the two claims in deciding what claim would
be preferable. Indeed, this seems to be the right answer, provided that
the crucial condition “all else being equal” were understood in the sense of
”there is no more reason to think that one is in any one region of the space
of epistemic possibility than in any other.” However, this latter condition is
almost never satisfied. Although one is aware in an evidential inference that
there is a range of possibilities of error, some of these possibilities will be
more worrisome than others. Clearly, some means of weighing the relevance
of scenarios is needed. Although I attempt no solution to this problem in
the present paper, I will comment on it in the concluding remarks.
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7 Conclusion: Dark Matter Revisited and Some
Challenges
With the concept of security in hand, we can now revisit the robustness
strategy and see more clearly how it works to promote security of evidence.
Recall the robustness argument regarding DAMA’s evidence claim as put
forth by Belli et al. The problem confronted by the argument is that, for all
that anyone knows, the theoretical model of the WIMP galactic halo used
by DAMA in their original analysis, the isothermal sphere model, might be
false. So what happens if some other model is the correct one? Belli et
al. examine four broad classes of WIMP galactic halo models, any of which
might, for all anyone knows, be the correct one, and they find that the
WIMP annual modulation hypothesis is “confirmed in all the investigated
scenarios” (Belli et al., 16). In other words, even if the isothermal sphere
model is false, so long as the correct model falls into one of the investigated
classes, DAMA’s annual modulation data are still evidence for WIMPs.
The effect of this argument, then, is to show, in a way that DAMA’s
original analysis did not, the extent to which the evidence for WIMP annual
modulation is secure. Note that the argument does not seek to establish
that the evidence is fully secure. To do so would require at least establishing
that the WIMP annual modulation hypothesis is confirmed in all possible
theoretical models, and Belli et al. do not attempt this.
Finally, let me address one worry and point to one interesting connec-
tion. The worry has to do with the analysis of knowledge. The connection
is with logical probabilities.
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The emphasis on knowledge in the above discussion might prompt the
worry that our grasp of the notion of security is going to prove as elusive
as has the correct analysis of knowledge in the interminable debates among
epistemology’s various warring camps. That would indeed be a troubling
outcome, but happily this worry can be easily set aside. The real value of
the concept of security is methodological, and the methodological implemen-
tation of the idea is largely independent of the correct analysis of knowledge.
Methodologically speaking, what is important is not primarily “how secure
is this inference?” but “how do I make this inference more secure than it
might otherwise be?” Since the latter question only involves judgments of
relative security, it does not require that one be able, at any time, to iden-
tify what one knows, but only to apply the strategies that enhance security.
The point can be stated succinctly: The robustness strategy and weakening
strategy enhance security under any plausible analysis of knowledge. The
same holds for the strengthening strategy, under the additional assumption
that strengthening adds to our knowledge. (If an analysis of knowledge leads
to complete skepticism, then strengthening will not add to our knowledge,
thus cannot restrict the space of epistemic possibilities, and hence cannot
enhance security.)
Finally, it may have been noted there is at least a family resemblance
between security and logical probability. Just as an evidence claim is secure
to the extent that it is true over the space of what is possible relative to
an epistemic situation, logical probability has often been framed in terms of
the satisfaction of a formula by a class of models consistent with a certain
body of background knowledge. Why not, a logical probabilist might ask,
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dispense with frequency-reliabilism (and frequency statistics) entirely (or at
least pursue a two-probability approach like Carnap 1962) and get at the
relevant desiderata more directly within a logical probability framework?
Perhaps there, like in Dr. Seuss’s land of Solla Sollew, one will find that
“they never have troubles, or at least very few.”
This challenge raises problems that cannot be satisfactorily addressed
in a brief discussion. Let me here simply respond by articulating the stance
here adopted. The evidence concept at issue here constitutes a kind of
generalization of the idea of a “reliable indicator,” (such as a compass!)
and thus to rest crucially on considerations of diachronic performance with
regard to errors. The severe test requirements amount to a codification
of such concerns, and although conceptual difficulties and debates plague
every philosophical approach to the foundations of probability, frequency-
probabilities have greatly facilitated the articulation of methodologies for
assessing evidence in this sense.
So, although one might use a logical probability approach to articulate
the concerns here subsumed under the concept of security, for the purposes
of the present account, this would still need to be accompanied by some
kind of frequentist approach to reliable evidence such as the error-statistical
account. Thus one inherits all the challenges facing logical probabilities
in addition to those that the error-statisician must confront. Fortunately,
such a multiplication of troubles (like those encountered on the way to Solla
Sollew) is not necessary for what I have sought here – namely, a unified
understanding of how strengthening, weakening, and robustness strategies
enable scientists to confront uncertainties regarding the assumptions under-
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lying their primary evidence claims.
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